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The New Global 
Economic Geography
When I first saw the title of this conference, “The New Economic
Geography: Effects and Policy Implications,” I thought it referred to
two branches of the economic literature that were developed in the
1990s. The first, with the title the “New Economic Geography,”
pioneered by Paul Krugman, Anthony Venables, Richard Baldwin,
and others,
1 seeks to explain why and how economic activity tends to
be geographically concentrated and whether such economic equilib-
ria are unique and stable or may instead be driven by history. The
second is about the impact of geography on development, work asso-
ciated primarily with Jeffrey Sachs and associates.
2
However this conference is not about economic geography in these
senses. Rather, it is about the startlingly rapid changes in the geograph-
ical locus of global economic activity and their consequences: the rise
of Asia; Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRICs);
3 globalization;
economic convergence; changes in the international financial
system—in short about the history of the world and the future of the
world economy.
4
I shall start by briefly discussing different aspects of these changes
and then focus on the most critical development, the rise of Asia,
especially that of China.
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The title of this conference, the first of the Bernanke era, also
reflects how far this premiere international economic conference has
come. In 1980, the theme of the conference was “Future Sources of
Loanable Funds for Agricultural Banks.” This year, it is about the
economic future of the world.
The changing global economic geography
There are several ways to describe the phenomenon of the change
in the locus of global economic activity. One is to talk about the rise
of the BRICs and the near-BRICs. This would place the focus on two
and a half of the Asian countries and one in Latin America. But once
one extends the group from India and China to include Russia and
Brazil, near-BRICs jostle for inclusion, for instance, Mexico and
South Korea. And it is then not clear where to stop.
One answer is to move from the BRICs to the non-Group of Seven
(G-7) members of the Group of 20 (G-20). This group comprises
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia
(a member of the Group of 8, G-8), Saudi Arabia, South Africa,
South Korea, and Turkey—12 in all, incidentally raising the question
of who will be the 20th country in the G-20. The G-20 includes
countries from the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America and is,
thus, geographically more representative of global developments than
are the BRICs or India and China. But the countries are diverse, and
it is difficult without going into the details of each economy to talk
about their future role in the global economy, except perhaps as the
core of a new directorate for the international financial institutions.  
Alternatively, we could talk about globalization, or about economic
convergence, and whether and how it is happening. We also could
talk about the rise of the South, except that in this case the South is
mainly in the East.
I shall describe the phenomenon as the “rise of Asia,” primarily the
rise of China and India. This is evident in Table 1 (Angus Maddison).
In summary, during the period 1950-2030, the share of global GDP
(measured in purchasing power parity, PPP, terms) produced by the
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Table 1
Maddison Tables on Population, GDP, and GDP Per Capita,
1900-2030
GDP per capita (1990 international $)      
1900 1950  1990 2001 2030   
W. Europe   2,893  4,579  15,966  19,256  30,503  
U.S. 4,091  9,561  23,201  27,948  44,286   
*Other W.O.  3,435  7,424  17,902  21,718  42,694  
Japan 1,180  1,921  18,789  20,683  32,774   
West 2,952 5,649  18,781  22,509  35,932   
E. Europe   1,438  2,111  5,450  6,027  12,334  
F. USSR   1,237  2,841  6,878  4,626  9,508  
L. America   1,109 2,506  5,053  5,811  8,949  
China 545  439  1,858  3,583  11,174   
India 599  619  1,309  1,957  6,103   
Other Asia   802  918  3,084  3,997  12,465  
Africa 601  894  1,444  1,489  1,987   
Rest 749 1,091  2,713 3,377 8,304   
World  1,262  2,111  5,157  6,049  11,689   
Population (millions)     
1900 1950  1990 2001 2030   
W. Europe  234  305  377  392  392  
U.S. 76  152  250  285 358  
*Other W. O.   10  24  48  55  67  
Japan 44  84  124  127  121   
West 364  565  800  859  938  
E. Europe   71  87  122  121  120  
F. USSR   125  180  289  290  295  
L. America   65  166  443 531 666  
China 400  547  1,135  1,275  1,477   
**India  285  359  839  1,024  1,414  
Other Asia   145  393  1,005  1,228  1,426  
Africa 110  227  627  821  1,319   
Rest  1,200 1,959  4,460 5,290 6,717   
World  1,564  2,524  5,260  6,149  7,655     
GDP (billion 1990 international $)
1900 1950  1990 2001 2030   
W. Europe   676  1,396  6,033  7,550  11,964  
U.S. 313 1,456  5,803 7,965  15,851   
*Other W.O.   34  180  862  1,190  1,914  
Japan  52  161  2,321 2,625 3,975   
West 1,075  3,192 15,020  19,331  33,704   
E. Europe   102  185  663  729  1,480  
F. USSR   154  510  1,988  1,343  2,805  
L. America  72  416  2,239  3,087  5,960  
China 218  240  2,109  4,570  16,504   
India  171 222  1,098  2,003  8,630   
Other Asia   116  361  3,099  4,908  17,775  
Africa 66  203  905  1,223  2,622   
Rest  899 2,137  12,101  17,863  55,776   
World 1,974  5,330  27,122  37,194  89,480
Source: “Evidence to the Select Committee on Economic Affairs, House of Lords,” submitted by
Angus Maddison, Feb. 20, 2005
**1950 population including Bangladesh and Pakistan would have been 444 million, and growth rate
0.89 percent.
Note: “*Other W.O.” refers to Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.
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United States, Europe
5 and the countries Maddison calls “other
Western offshoots,” Canada, Australia, and New Zealand is expected
to decline from 70 percent to 38 percent. The share produced by Asia
is expected to rise from 19 percent to 52 percent.
6
Maddison projects that by 2030 Chinese GDP will account for
more than 18 percent of global GDP measured in PPP terms and will
have overtaken U.S. GDP, also measured in PPP terms (Chart 1).
India is projected to be at about half the (PPP) GDP of China.
Let me note that although I will use the PPP numbers, they are seri-
ously misleading.
7 In PPP terms, World Bank (WB) data show Chinese
GDP at 69 percent of U.S. GDP in 2005. But, at market exchange
rates, Chinese GDP was only 18 percent of U.S. GDP last year (Chart
2). It is the dollar values that represent the current weight of countries
in the international economy. We should bear in mind that, using
market exchange rates, Japan has the largest economy in Asia, about
double the size of China’s. Measured at market exchange rates, Asia
accounted for 25 percent of global GDP in 2005, well below the 40
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2001 Percent of World Population
The share of Asia in global population is projected to remain roughly
constant during the period 1950-2030, rising from 55 percent to 58
percent (Chart 3). By contrast, the share of the current “West” (exclud-
ing Japan) will decline from 30 percent to 16 percent of the global
population. Global population is expected to grow by about 20 percent
in the next 25 years and much more rapidly than that in Africa. 
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However measured, we are now in a process in which, in economic
terms, the West is in relative decline, and Asia is rising. In a longer-
term perspective, this is both the rise of Asia and also the recovery of
Asia—for, according to Maddison,
8 as late as 1820, when the Indus-
trial Revolution was getting under way, Asia accounted for more than
70 percent of the world’s population and 59 percent of world GDP.
Although I will talk mainly about China and India, it is important
when considering the rise of Asia to recall that Japan, the second
largest economy in the world, already has risen. And we also should
note less than 15 years ago, the Asian miracle was regarded as prima-
rily a phenomenon of Japan, Korea, and the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN).  
In focusing on the rise of Asia, I leave out areas and issues that are
extremely important for the future of the global economy and polity.
Among them are the economies of the Middle East and other chal-
lenges of development, especially in Africa, Latin America, and parts
of Asia.  
In discussing the rise of Asia, I will take up five issues in more
detail: first, the rise of China; second, that of India; third, regional
developments; fourth, implications for the world economy; and
fifth, political implications.  
The rise of Asia: China   
How long will the rapid growth of China continue? There are
important historical precedents in the region, Japan, Korea, and the
ASEAN countries.
9 Their histories tell different stories: that of Japan,
for which almost full catch-up is possible—although it is hard to
know whether we should start counting from 1868 or from 1945;
that of Korea, which sustained exceptionally rapid growth, is possible
for more than 40 years; and that of ASEAN, for which long growth
spurts are possible.  
China already has been growing at rates in excess of 10 percent on
average for more than a quarter-century, and its policymakers have
demonstrated considerable economic management skills, not least inThe New Global Economic Geography 183
warding off foreign pressures for revaluation. The regional precedents
suggest that China can keep growing at very high—but declining—
rates for a long while. Further, if the maximum potential growth rate is
related to the distance of the economy from the frontier—as determined
by per capita income levels in the most advanced economies—China’s
rapid growth can continue well beyond 2030. For even in 2030, accord-
ing to Maddison’s projections, PPP income per capita in China will be
only one quarter that in the United States. And the fact that the bulk of
China’s labor force remains rural, and to a considerable extent agricul-
tural, reinforces the view that China’s Arthur Lewis-type growth process
could have a long way to run.
If the Chinese economy were to continue to grow in real terms at a
rate of 7 percent greater than that of the U.S. economy at a constant
exchange rate—as it has for more than 20 years—its GDP would
indeed overtake that of the United States in about another quarter-
century. Further, the yuan is likely to appreciate during that period
relative to the dollar, ceteris paribus (that is, with unchanged domes-
tic growth rates) reducing the length of the catch-up period.  
But China faces considerable challenges, and the economy is unlikely
to continue growing at 10 percent for another quarter-century.
Notable among the challenges are: exchange rate management and
realignment; financial sector reform; state enterprise reform; resource
and environmental constraints; the aging population; development (or
redevelopment) of a social safety net; reduction of social gaps, espe-
cially between country and city; and political transition.
China’s exchange rate management has until now been impressive
and successful from the viewpoint of its goal of supporting export-led
growth. It has come at the cost of a massive and costly buildup of
foreign exchange reserves, but with surprisingly low costs in terms of
inflation. At some point—perhaps because of inflationary pressures
and the costs of the continuing reserve buildup—the process of
exchange rate appreciation that other countries in the region, includ-
ing Japan and Korea, have experienced will have to begin. And that
will likely contribute to reducing the growth rate of the economy in
real terms.
10 Given China’s saving rate,
11 it is likely that when the184 Stanley Fischer
process of secular appreciation of the yuan gets under way, the
currency will appreciate at a rate that maintains a sizeable continuing
surplus in the current account, as has happened in the case of Japan.  
Financial sector and state enterprise reform are closely related. One
way of thinking of the occasional recapitalizations of China’s banks is as
a fiscal process, in which the banks provide loans to enterprises that are
in effect repaid by the state through later recapitalizations. It appears
that progress is being made in reforming the financial system, but, as of
now, it remains a point of vulnerability and an obstacle to a rapid
opening of the capital account and flexibility of the exchange rate. 
China faces the problem of a rapidly aging population. While this
will be a problem from the viewpoint of fiscal transfer programs
(which, however, are on a proportionately much smaller scale than
in richer countries), the processes of urbanization and industrializa-
tion can continue by drawing on the massive rural population.
Environmental issues will have to be dealt with, and it is clear from
the trends in global commodity prices that China may well face
continuing adverse terms of trade changes as well as rising domestic
resource costs.
Income disparities in China between the coast and inland provinces,
the cities and the countryside, and the rich and poor have been growing
rapidly and are receiving increasing attention from the government.
These, combined with the breakdown of the social safety net of earlier
times, produce social and political tensions that could threaten the
continuation of the growth process. And political pressures associated
with the desire for democratization, which tend to rise as income levels
increase, constitute another source of tension.
The Chinese economy suffers from one disadvantage that the other
Asian miracle economies did not: It is already very large. This raises
the question of whether it can continue to rely on exports to power
its growth—for the capacity of the rest of the world to absorb
Chinese exports must be determined by the global growth rate.
12 The
answer is that China probably cannot continue to rely on export-led
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growth, and, therefore, that the switch to domestic-demand-led
growth, which has been talked about for some time, is essential if
growth is to continue in the range of 7 percent to 10 percent per
annum range.
Is China vulnerable to a 1990s-style Asian financial crisis? There are
some negative symptoms. The first is a share of investment in GDP
that according to the official data exceeds 40 percent. This cannot be
efficient; it must be part of the process of generating bad loans and is
reminiscent of precrisis investment rates in some of the Asian crisis
economies. The second is a financial system that remains weak. But
some of the vulnerabilities that led to the Asian crisis are not present:
China does not have a current account deficit; there are not massive
short-term capital flows; and capital controls appear to be relatively
effective, even if not fully watertight. Further, foreign exchange
reserves are so large that it is hard to imagine a successful attack on
the currency. On balance, a 1990s-style international financial crisis
appears highly unlikely.
What about other types of crises? The growth processes in Japan,
Korea, and the other rapidly growing countries of East Asia were
punctuated by occasional economic crises. Since the modern Chinese
economic reform process began around the end of the 1970s, there
has been only one major economic (and political) crisis. This is an
unusual record, even among the extraordinary records of its Asian
neighbors. Chinese economic management has benefited from
careful study of the history of its neighbors, and—despite the long list
of potential problems just noted—there are no obvious sources of
likely crises in the near term.  
But trees do not grow to the sky. And trends that appear inevitable at
one point of time can appear doomed from the perspective of only a
decade or two later. In brief, to continue rolling out the clichés, it is
difficult to forecast, especially about the future, and it would be unwise
to assume that China will be immune to future economic crises.  
Nonetheless, even if there were to be a crisis or other interruptions
to growth in the future, it is reasonable to believe that Chinese growth
will continue at a rate that on average well exceeds that of countries
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at the current frontier of economic development. The Chinese
economy will be the largest in the world, measured in dollars at
market exchange rates, within the lifetimes of many of today’s sympo-
sium attendees.
The rise of Asia: India   
GDP in China and India were roughly similar in 1950.
13 Since then,
China has grown much more rapidly than India. Its growth spurt is
both more recent and modest than that of China. At present Indian
GDP, measured in exchange-rate mediated dollars, is approximately
the same as that of South Korea and behind Japan and China. In these
terms, Indian GDP in 2005 was $785 billion (WB data), 12th largest
in the world, in a group of five countries with very similar GDPs
(Brazil, South Korea, India, Mexico, and Russia, in that order).
In PPP terms, according to WB estimates, India had the fourth
largest economy in the world in 2005, almost as large as Japan, a bit
under half the size of PPP GDP for China. And the GDP of India has
been growing at rates approaching 8 percent in recent years, less than
that of China, but nonetheless impressive. It’s possible that if China
did not exist, today we would be talking about the Indian miracle. 
India’s growth prospects are enhanced by the existence of a more
market-oriented financial system than that of China; a more flexible
and well-managed exchange rate system; a more market-oriented
monetary policy; the existence of a legal framework that is more
developed and more predictable than that of China; and a stable
democratic political system that enables the country to deal with
social tensions within its political framework. Its growth prospects are
set back by its so-far-slow pace of integration into the global
economy, the slow pace of the legal process, excessive fiscal deficits,
the political inability to pursue the reform process with as much
determination as has China, an extensive bureaucracy, and excessive
state regulatory intervention in the economy. Indeed, the greatest
reason to be optimistic about India’s future growth process is that
considering it has grown so well in the last 15 years without aThe New Global Economic Geography 187
sustained deep reform process, it will certainly do much better if and
when the reform process deepens.  
While Indian growth rates have not yet reached Chinese levels, the
Indian economy appears on the whole to be more robust. India expe-
rienced a major foreign exchange crisis in 1990. One response was the
start of the reforms of the first half of the 1990s. Since then, the
exchange rate has become more flexible, the growth rate has risen,
and some reforms have continued. While no economy is guaranteed
against crises, the Indian economy looks less vulnerable to a major
crisis than it was more than a decade ago. But there are antireform
strands in Indian politics that could result in policy changes that
reduce the growth rate well below its potential.
The rise of Asia: Regional developments
There are already important and rapidly developing economic link-
ages among parts of Asia, particularly in East Asia, where a grouping
of ASEAN plus Japan, China, and Korea seems to be emerging. The
politics of such a grouping are not simple, for the Japan-China rela-
tionship is evolving as the Chinese economy grows and as it becomes
clearer that China will overtake Japan at some point in the not-too-
distant future. The implications of this change can be summarized by
noting Japan is the largest shareholder in the Asian Development
Bank (ADB), and, by tradition, appoints its head; the formation of
an Asian Monetary Fund during the Asian crisis in 1998 was not
strongly supported by China; and China will want to play a greater
role in any future regional institutions than it does in the ADB.  
Some in East Asia talk of following the example of Europe by
improving trade and financial links, and later moving to a common
market and unified financial system.  It is recognized that this will take
a long time, but those involved note correctly that it took the European
Union (EU) a long time to evolve to its current condition. The Euro-
pean equilibrium is simplified by the fact that no single country
dominates the EU, whereas China likely would be the dominant power
in an East Asian union. For many years, Europe was driven by the
Franco-German determination to build a structure that would prevent
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any future wars. Possibly East Asia could eventually be driven by a
similar process through a China-Japan reconciliation, though recent
trends have not been in that direction. One could imagine Japan even-
tually playing a role similar to that of the United Kingdom in Europe,
as a leading member, but one whose views on the nature of the organ-
ization may often differ from other leading members.
At present, there is much talk of an East Asian common currency.
Whether there would be a basis for such a currency depends on how
China’s financial and currency management systems evolve. Since
China would eventually be dominant in an East Asian economic
bloc, its preferred currency arrangements will determine the eventual
outcome.  The non-Chinese members probably would like to have a
common currency so as to have some impact on regionwide mone-
tary policy, but it would be up to China whether it would grant that
role. Here again, one could see Japan playing an independent role by
retaining its currency, like the United Kingdom does in Europe.
Further to the west, a large economic bloc could eventually develop
around India, but that prospect is inhibited by the strained relations
between India and Pakistan. The dynamics of a South Asian
economic bloc built around India would be different from those of
East Asia because, unlike in the case of China, there is no Japan—no
advanced industrial economy—in the neighborhood.
The rise of Asia: Economic implications   
The rise of Asia, especially the rise of East Asia and of India, is
already reshaping the world economy. Concerns over globalization
have become a prominent part of the economic debate in Europe and
the United States. The focus is the impact from the millions of
Chinese and Indian workers who are entering the global labor force
on the wages of less-skilled workers in the West.  
One often hears the view that “China has a comparative advantage in
everything.” This is an argument that every economist can demolish,
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but doing so does not diminish the anxiety level. Part of the anxiety
must derive from the discomforts of the adjustment process forced by
the dynamism of Asia, and part must derive from the fact that the
wages of unskilled workers in the West may be adversely affected by
such competition. Policy can deal with these consequences through
adjustment aid and education. But unless that is done, the negative
fallout from this competition will likely continue.
The last time I heard this degree of anxiety was during the Asian
crisis, when many of China’s neighbors expressed the same concerns.
At the time, I asked people whether they would prefer to have a pros-
perous or a poor neighbor. Most opted for the prosperous neighbor,
though I often had the sense that they might prefer their neighbor
progress at a more measured pace.  
By now, most of the developing countries and most of China’s
neighbors can count the gains from China’s (and India’s) booming
growth. China’s voracious appetite for raw materials, which has
produced a boom in commodity prices, has helped many developing
countries, as well as commodity-rich industrial countries, such as
Australia.  China’s investments in Africa—where Indian companies
also have long been active—have lately received media attention.
China’s and India’s energy needs have helped push oil and other
energy prices to their highest sustained levels and have contributed to
the prosperity of energy producers in the Middle East, Russia, central
Asia, and Africa, where there are now many oil exporters. China’s and
India’s energy needs have driven their oil companies into the interna-
tional arena, competing for sources of upscale oil. IBM laptops are
becoming Chinese. An Indian steel company is now the world’s
largest. The trends are unmistakable.
The global economy has been growing rapidly by historical stan-
dards in the last few years, despite concerns over global imbalances.
In particular, the years 2004-2006 will see high growth rates in Latin
America and Africa because of the rise of Asia as well as the global
engine of U.S. growth.  
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Asian growth has benefited greatly from the relatively open interna-
tional trading system that was built up after World War II. All the
East Asian miracle economies pursued export-led growth strategies,
with the bulk of the exports going to industrial countries in the West.
The recent failure of the Doha Round is deplorable, particularly if it
is final, mainly because it reduces the opportunities that some of the
poorest countries would have had to export agricultural products. But
opportunities to increase industrial exports still remain open to most
developing countries.  
The basis for the current international economic system—and it is a
system—was designed by the victors of World War II. The implications
of the rise of Asia and of emerging market countries for the interna-
tional financial system will be at the center of attention at the meetings
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and WB in Singapore next
month. The newcomers want to play a bigger role in the international
agencies, and they should.
14 It is to be hoped that the current dominant
forces in the IMF and WB will make the necessary room, though,
historically, the established powers have lagged in making room for
others. While the newcomers want to play a bigger role in setting the
rules of the game, it is not clear what rules they would like to change
and whether they will want to radically change the international
system. To do that, they will need to further develop the analytic capac-
ity to formulate proposals for change, a process that will involve
strengthening research and policy research institutions, and the mech-
anisms through which they affect policy.  
However, the impact of China and India on the international finan-
cial system does not depend mainly on the size of their quotas in the
international financial institutions. It depends more on how important
Shanghai, China (or Shanghai-Hong Kong), and Mumbai, India,
become as financial centers. It is difficult to develop a new financial
center, and some—like Paris—have declined in importance relative to
where they stood a century ago. Others, like Tokyo and Hong Kong,
have become important, but do not yet compete with London and
New York. If China indeed becomes the largest economy in the world;
develops a market-based monetary policy; gradually liberalizes the
capital account of the balance of payments and allows the exchange rate
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to float; and can develop the necessary legal framework for the efficient
operation of the financial markets, then there would be a good reason
for Shanghai-Hong Kong to blossom as a financial center. If that were
to happen, we could imagine the yuan becoming a major international
currency, along with the dollar and the euro. But that is likely to take a
long time. And it is an interesting question as to what language will be
spoken in that market. I would bet on English.  
Mumbai has a language advantage; a market-based monetary policy
and a flexible exchange rate; a more market-based financial system; and
a more-developed legal system than has Shanghai. But the potential size
of the domestic economy will probably cause Mumbai to develop more
slowly than Shanghai as an international financial center. Nonetheless,
there is every reason to believe it will become an increasingly important
player in the international financial markets.  
The rise of Asia: Political implications
So far, the international economic system has dealt reasonably well
with its changing economic geography. While there are major concerns
about how the U.S. current account deficit will be unwound, the failure
of the Doha Round, protectionism more generally, and the effects of the
entry of another billion low-wage workers into the international
economy, the overall impact of the rise of Asia on the international
system seems to have been favorable for most other countries. In addi-
tion, the rapid growth of Asian economies has contributed to an
extremely rapid decline in global poverty in the last quarter-century.  
It is easy to describe crisis scenarios, particularly with regard to the
unwinding of the U.S. current account deficit—and many delight and
profit from doing so. But, overall, it seems that the international
economy and its market and governmental organizations have sufficient
flexibility, and perhaps even the wisdom, needed to deal with the
required adjustments.   
The potential political consequences of the economic rise of two
more great powers, and the relative decline of others, could be more
worrying. The economic rise of both Germany and Japan in the second
half of the 19th century and into the 20th century was accompanied by192 Stanley Fischer
their growing military might, increasing assertiveness, and, eventually,
terrible wars. The rise of the Soviet Union and of international commu-
nism also was associated with major wars and political instability, in this
case, around the world.
Are we more sophisticated now than the world was a hundred years
ago? How long can the Pax Americana (American Peace) continue to
maintain stability in Asia?  How wise will the sole superpower be in its
future dealings in Asia? How, in the long run, will the relationship
between Russia, with its underdeveloped and underpopulated east, and
China, with its massive population directly to the south, develop? Can
China and India take their rightful places in the world and in their
regions without further major military confrontations? Does the fact
that China and India are nuclear powers (so is Pakistan) make the situ-
ation more stable as well as more dangerous, or just more dangerous?
How will a potentially nuclear Iran influence the equilibrium? How
important is the North Korean nuclear threat, and how long is Japan
willing to remain non-nuclear in the face of that and other threats?
These questions are too complicated for economists to answer.
Probably, somewhere in a parallel universe, political scientists are
discussing them. Perhaps—but not very likely—the parallelism will
extend to their concluding that the political issues are likely to be
resolved peacefully, and that the economic issues appear intractable.
Whatever they conclude, the answers to these political questions,
even more than the economic issues we have been discussing, will be
key to the future of the world.  
Author’s note: The author is grateful to conference participants for helpful comments and to
Nir Klein and Mark Nulman for their assistance.
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Endnotes
1See, for example, Paul Krugman, Geography and Trade, MIT Press, 1991.  
2See John Luke Gallup and Jeffrey Sachs, with Andrew Mellenger, “Geography
and Economic Development,” Annual World Bank Conference on Development
Economics, 1998, pp. 127-188.
3Brazil, Russia, India, and China have been identified by Goldman Sachs as the
key economies of the future.
4Krugman (1991).  
5I have taken a generous view of the extent of Europe by including eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union. This means that Russia is not included in Asia for
purposes of this paper, a view that is at best only half right.  
6Maddison includes parts of the Middle East, such as Turkey, in Asia.  
7Why then should one use the PPP data? Mainly because they do take into
account differences between current and likely future exchange rates, which are
relevant to future comparisons among countries; in part, because they are available
and systematic.  
8Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, 2001,The World
Economy, A Millennial Perspective, Table 3-1c (p. 127) and Table 1-1 (p. 28).
9Maddison (2001, p. 143) presents data on the growth performance of the coun-
tries of “Resurgent Asia.” The average annual growth rate of per capita PPP GDP for
the period 1950-1999 of China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan (China), and Thailand was 4.4 percent. The growth rate of Chinese per
capita PPP GDP was highest among the periods shown by Maddison (1950-1973,
1973-1990, 1990-1999) in the last decade of the 20th century, at 6.4 percent. The
most rapid and sustained growth performance during the period was that of South
Korea, which averaged 6 percent (per capita, PPP) during the 50 years. Note that
Maddison lists data for Taiwan separately from those of China; in Maddison’s data,
in 1950 Taiwanese GDP (PPP terms) was approximately 3 percent that of China,
and, by 1999, it had reached 8.5 percent of that of China.
10However, its impact on the growth rate of the dollar value of Chinese GDP
would be smaller.
11China’s high saving rate has been attributed in part to the absence of a convinc-
ing social safety net and to uncertainty about future economic growth. In addition,
high-growing economies have generally been high savers, a feature that the late
Franco Modigliani used to assert was fully consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis.  
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12I am grateful to Lew Alexander of Citigroup for raising this question.
13Maddison (2001, p. 214) shows Chinese (PPP) GDP at $240 billion (in 1990
PPP dollars) and Indian GDP at $222 billion. According to Maddison’s estimates,
per capita PPP GDP in India generally exceeded that in China until 1978.  
14Some of these issues have their counterparts on the political side, for instance, the
debate over the reform of the United Nations, especially the Security Council. In this
regard, it helps that China is already one of the permanent members of the council.
 